The Anti-Homoness of Straight Hipster Politics: On Homo Family Values and the Question of Political Change

David Wojnarowicz, Untitled (Genet), 1990


1.

Hipster irony appeals to overly earnest straight people, especially straight men (and their sometimes adoring queer fans).

Here’s one version of straight hipsterism: Acceptance of homosexuality and homo marriage occurred relatively quickly in the U.S. because homosexuality and homo marriage aren’t really hip.

The homo who desires to marry and build a family wants nothing more, according to the hipster, than to be “one of the boys.” In other words, the legal/political recognition of homos and their family values is not real political change.

2.

Hipsters aren’t wrong, to be fair, for having some fun at the expense of homos who, like hipsters, want to keep their position high up the ladder of respectability and be cool.

Some homos want nothing more than to be straight (but not that straight).

The problem is that hipster self-righteousness requires a sacrifice: homo difference and dignity.

3.

To the hipster, homoness is the enemy of coolness. Homoness is the recapitulation of normie-cis-white-male-straightness. 

That’s why I think hipster irony is just really fucking dull. It’s more of the same: straight (male) resentment and self-righteousness masquerading as progressive politics.

Nothing irritates hipsters more than homo joy and affluence.

4.

That’s why, to riff on David Halperin’s description of straight hipster irony in How To Be Gay (2012)straight hipsters just love to turn homos and their family values into the new normie straight dude. Homos become “fodder for [hispter] irony”: 

By acknowledging straight hipsters’ affection for such quaint cultural forms and practices [like marriage], while refusing to express that affection except in a grotesque, exaggerated fashion, in case someone should get the wrong idea, straight hipster irony maintains and consolidates (though it’s much too cool to flaunt it) a distant and disengaged position for hipsters—that is, a position of relative social privilege (395-96).

Straight hipster irony enables you to distance yourself from your straightness while castigating the desires of homos who want to marry and build families of their own.

5.

Here’s an example of hipster homo (but not that homo) love: “It is weirdly possible to imagine a scenario,” writes one Substack hipster, “where the United States becomes a violently misogynistic white ethnostate, but gay marriage still remains the law of the land.”

Is our hipster arguing that the reason homos and homo marriage gained relatively quick cultural acceptance is that they fit, hand in glove, within the normie logic of “a violently misogynistic white ethnostate”?

Is our hipster asserting that homos and their family values enjoy popular support in the U.S. because they are entirely compatible with normie-cis-white supremacy-straight-guyness (pronouns: he/bruh)? 

Who needs enemies when you have allies like the hipster! 

6.

In his view, homos and their family values have achieved quick legal/political victories because they have chosen to suck the cock of cis-white-straight-dudeness.

“Pointing out that context,” our hipster claims, “is not a critique of the movements that succeeded as being ‘secretly’ conservative or oppressive, but instead a critique of the society that only lets itself do good things for bad reasons” (emphasis added). 

Who needs enemies when you have neighbors like that! 

7.

Anyway, according to the hipster view, Pete Buttegig won the Democratic presidential primary in Iowa in 2019 because he just loves sucking white dick.

Any evidence to the contrary is evidence of a cover-up. 

Yasmin Nair, for example, asserts that even the Buttigieg kids are part of a secret, oppressive conservative plot to win white-normie-straight-bruh political power: 

Given their talent for curation, it’s hard not to wonder if the Buttigieges didn’t also choose their [biracial] children as carefully as Melania Trump chose her outfits. This doesn’t mean that the pair don’t love their incredibly adorable children, but given that even Chasten looks like he was chosen from a catalog of ‘Good Gay Men,’ it’s safe to say that even the most seemingly personal details of Pete’s life are carefully chosen.

8.

Hipster paranoia (i.e., nothing good can happen in people’s hearts or society) may also explain why our hipster fails to mention the HIV/AIDS crisis in his essay.

While the hipster does recognize that straight opposition to homo love was (remains?) violent and horrific, extending well into the 1990s before giving way to growing support for homos and their family values starting in the early 2000s, he does not seem to know that the 1990s were also the worst years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in, for example, Chicago.

The hipster can’t even entertain the idea that witnessing homos suffering and dying in large numbers because of a demonic virus, which our government was too slow to address, might have been a bridge to compassion that led to a genuine change of heart among our fellow citizens. 

9.

And because any legal/political recognition is necessarily a form of assimilation, the hipster can’t risk acknowledging (or take seriously) the substantial legal/political recognitions won by Black and Trans* people over the past few decades.

So, he doesn’t mention that the vast majority of Americans support some form of police reform. Likewise, the hipster doesn’t seem to realize that most Americans do support Trans* people. Our hipster, however, dismisses the very real gender dysphoria experienced by Trans* youth, categorizing it as a common experience for all youth going through puberty.

Also, our hipster doesn’t mention that it was a conservative Supreme Court Justice, Neil Gorsuch, who authored the majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, which declared it unconstitutional to discriminate against Trans* people in the workplace. 

Finally, the hipster’s faith in the straight coddling of homo desire likely blinds him to the fact that the Supreme Court is considering whether or not to relitigate the constitutionality of same-sex marriage on Friday, November 7th, 2025 (Thankfully, the Court chose [for now] not to relitigate homo marriage. It sure must be nice not to have one’s dignity up for routine legal review.)

10. 

Homos and their family values gained quick acceptance, according to sophisticated hipsters, because they offered a lifeline to normie-cis-white-straight-maleness.

In reality, it was the other way around. 

Homosexual activists made surprising use of a straight male invention: the concept of homosexuality.

Homo identity politics was so successful (like all forms of Black, Trans,* and Women’s respectability/identity politics before and after it) precisely because it compromised with the protocols of the dominant masculinist culture, the culture—then, now, and for the foreseeable future—in power.

Specifically, homo identity politics accepted the conservative logic that sex(uality) is gender and gender is sex(uality). 

The idea that homoness is anything more than a sexuality, anything other than a sexual orientation/identity—like a culture, a specific lifestyle, or a uniquely “feminine” way of relating to women, men, and the world—remains a controversial subject in homo circles. 

Take a look at Andrew Sullivan’s Virtually Normal (1996) and Horace Griffin’s Their Own Receive Them Not (2010)–very different versions of homo identity politics.

In How To Be Gay (2012), Halperin cogently analyzes the history of homo identity politics—the history, that is, of what Judith Butler calls a “necessary error” (Bodies That Matter [1993], 175).  

11.

Homo political gains have, indeed, come at the expense of a different history: the history of (homo)sexuality.

The concept of homosexuality was created in the late 1800s (and with the publication of the RSV, incorporated into various biblical texts in the 1940s), but I am more interested in the history of what terms like “homosexuality” are meant to describe—namely, desire. 

We are, in a sense, “born that way.” We are born as wild and wildly desiring animals, entirely dependent on the care of our parents and society—the very “institutions” that frustrate our desires.

Although no one knows what causes one’s sexual orientation, David Halperin offers a promising idea. He claims that “[l]ong before they ever have sex . . . young people have genre” (343).

Briefly, genres are formal rules that govern specific social interactions. Halperin explains that what a server might say to a complete stranger in Ann Arbor differs from what a server in Paris might say in a similar situation without causing a scandal (131). 

Genres are also pragmatic. “[T]hey provide people, in their daily practices, with concrete means of interacting with one another and negotiating specific social situations—and they instruct them in the right ways to do so (132).

Halperin suggests that genre might be all that’s necessary to create consistent, persistent, and insistent non-standard or queer relationships with mainstream cultural forms, including marriage, masculinity, authenticity, abjection, and so on. Halperin writes,

[Genre] may be all [children] need in order to forge certain non-standard relations to normative sexual and gender identities. For by making non-standard emotional connections to cultural forms, they effectively refuse the pressing social invitation to assume a conventional, heteronormative positioning and they effectively acquire non-standard sexual and gender identities, identifications, and orientations (343).

Once acquired, a non-standard relationship to cultural forms becomes, like everything experienced in our youth, difficult to change in adulthood. There are no “fresh starts.”

The second chance that is your adult life is an opportunity to change, to the extent possible, your biological and cultural heritage. If you’re lucky, your adult life is a question: What am I interested in?

12.

Our hipster believes homos have failed to launch. For him, homos and their family values easily fit into the standard mold of normie-cis-white-straight-family values. Acceptance of homo family values is not, according to hipsters, a genuine legal/political change.

Queer theoretical differences, like those between Leo Bersani and Judith Butler (1995), David Halperin and Leo Bersani (1996), Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler (1999), Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004) and How To Be Gay (2012), are all about the character of and possibilities for real political change.

In a forthcoming essay, I argue that Martha Nussbaum misjudges Judith Butler’s politics as “hip quietism.” Instead, I argue, Butler’s politics is a subtle form of compromised resistance to the norms of straightness.

To be clear, Nussbaum is not opposed to resistance as a political strategy. She is not a radical political figure. For example, Nussbaum does not believe, as Michal Warner does, that “marriage is unethical” (The Trouble With Normal [1999], vii). 

In her review of Warner’s book, Nussbaum highlights the importance of cultural forms and routines for most people (232). Still, I believe she is too optimistic about the kind of change humans can achieve to appreciate the subtlety of Butler’s queer politics. 

13.

It is manifestly true that Butler’s theory is highly pessimistic about the potential for legal/political change. Our being here is premised on being subject to the desires, norms, and influences of the dominant culture. 

Even so, Butler clearly has faith in the possibility of change. Performativity is their term for a limited but creatively resistant form of freedom. 

“The structuring presence of heterosexual constructs within gay and lesbian sexuality,” Butler argues in Gender Trouble (1990), “does not mean that those constructs determine gay and lesbian sexuality nor that gay and lesbian sexuality are derivable or reducible to those constructs. . . . The presence of these norms not only constitute a site of power that cannot be refused, but they can and do become the site of parodic contest and display that robs compulsory heterosexuality of its claims to naturalness and originality” (158, emphasis original). 

The Butlerian subject is us. It is normal and queer. 

14.

In the essay on Butler I hope to finish soon, I also argue that How To Be Gay may be read as a redescription of Butler’s political ambition, as initially described in Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter.

Halperin’s understanding of the politics of homo subculture perfectly captures the character of Butler’s queer politics.

Their queer politics “reckons with the world as it is, with the way we lived and still live now, and [seek] less to change the world than to resist its inflictions (even at the cost of appearing reactionary, rather than progressive)—[thereby offering] an important emotional and political resource . . . to many different kinds of socially disqualified people, at least to those whose sense of irredeemable wrongness makes them willing to pay the achingly high price for it” (219-220). 

15.

In summary, participation in what’s normal is not a matter of personal choice.

You can’t choose your sex(uality) or gender (realities created and enforced by the dominant culture before we come into the world and learn to speak its language).

That comforts some homos. And why should homos be different from nearly everyone else? 

In any case, it is also true that the dominant regime can’t completely control what you do with its normative categories. 

As Fester from the Addams Family reminds us, “Normal is difficult to achieve.”

That’s why queer politics also appeals to many homos. Failing to take “normal” too seriously is the point of queer politics.

16.

But our hipster advises us to embrace a politics of fluidity. We are advised not to stress about sex(uality) and gender norms.

I guess we are to entirely forget our hipster’s essay, wherein he ranks similarly situated minority groups on a ladder of value. If homos are even on his ladder, we are farthest away from the heavenly clouds of political coolness.

17.

The hipster seems to believe that recognizing the legitimate suffering of the hip and queer, Black communities, and Trans* people requires a sacrifice: the difference and dignity of homos. 

If that’s right, the hipster’s argument collaborates with HIV/AIDS. It collaborates with evil. 

Meanwhile, the option of carefully attending to admittedly uncool forms of queer desire remains available, if seldom considered and even less often taken—at least by straight (male) hipsters and their adoring queer fans.  

Gender Politics & the Indoctrination of Boys

Jon Favreau and Jon Lovett of Pod Save America recently interviewed the inimitable Representative Sarah McBride (D-Delaware). Among McBride’s interesting insights and arguments is the idea that the two major U.S. political parties are gendered. Republicans are gendered masculine (or identified in terms of fatherhood). Democrats are gendered feminine (or identified in terms of motherhood).

Here’s their conversation (if you prefer to watch, jump in at 12:44):

Rep. McBride: I’ve been thinking about how do you fight back against Trump in a smart way . . . because we are so susceptible to sort of this Trump derangement syndrome dynamic. We’ve been screaming about democracy. . . rights and the rule of law for so long—and clearly, this country voted for someone who incited an insurrection. . . .

The Democratic party is the woman of politics and the Republican party is the man of politics. It’s why Donald Trump can scream and yell and people see him as strong—and why when [Democrats] scream and yell we’re seen as hysterical and shrill. It’s why Donald Trump can hate and insult more than half of this country—because we tolerate deadbeat dads, but Democrats can’t say anything about any voters that [impugn] their motives and their good faith—because a mom has to love every single one of her children. So, I’ve been thinking about how do you grapple with that reality that is a real double standard. . . .

Lovett: Let’s test this new way of talking . . . . You’re trying to make people understand how dangerous it is that Donald Trump is coming after basic academic freedom, but you’re worried it’s not going to resonate with people. How do you talk about it?

Rep. McBride: With all of these actions that we’re seeing against immigrants, against institutions, [the Trump Administration is] picking on the most unpopular, the most vulnerable. They’re picking on people who are easy targets. I do think . . . you have to go back to what we were talking about before, which is that if they can do it [to them], they can do it to you . . . . They can do it to my constituents . . . . I think we can do a better job by making the main character [of our story] our constituents.

Changing our political situation requires, McBride claims, recognizing how political party affiliation is gendered. For example, Republicans can get away with being angry, but Democrats must always be empathetic. “[A] mom,” McBride says, “has to love every single one of her children.”

Motherhood is often the object of politics because the public sphere, the sphere of politics, is gendered masculine. The traditional story is that politics is for men; the management of the home is for women. For McBride, motherhood is the subject of political action.

But what is maternal politics, exactly? In her response to Lovett’s question about how to discuss maternal politics in the context of education, McBride attempts to clarify the character of partisan gendered politics. Her answer, namely that the mother protects “easy targets” of public abuse, isn’t specific enough–so it can’t inspire serious Democratic political action.

In what follows, I ask a revised version of Lovett’s question to McBride: How do you talk about maternal politics in the context of early childhood public education? To answer the question well, we need a definition of maternal politics that is specific enough to avoid confusion (e.g., terrorist organizations like Moms for Liberty claim to love all children) and to provoke serious liberal and/or progressive public action. I propose the following definition:

Maternal politics = public action(s) to secure and defend a boy’s right to become a man who desires like a woman/mother.

Why a boy’s right to desire like a woman/mother? Consider recent oral arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States regarding an opt-out option for religious conservatives who do not want their children exposed to readings that mention/feature same-sex desire in the public school classroom. It was a book about male same-sex marriage that caught the attention of conservative Associate Justice Samuel Alito.

Conservatives are manifestly not as passionate or concerned about a girl’s public education. What they care about is the reproduction of traditional or normative masculinity. Hence their focus on male same-sex desire. Conservatives think that male homosexuality is especially threatening to the future of straight maleness.

I think my definition of maternal politics helps explain the recurring outbursts of straight anxiety about male homosexuality and the “indoctrination” of boys in our public elementary school. Furthermore, the specificity of my definition of maternal politics (one of many possible proposals) allows us to form a more direct and beneficially partisan answer to (the revised version of) Lovett’s question about gender politics and academic freedom in Trump’s U.S.

Here is the take I will explain and defend below: Conservatives have used the public school system to indoctrinate boys, and we have generally failed to resist it because we (unconsciously) agree with the “obvious” meaning of the conservative premise: boys should be boys. Instead, we should reform early childhood public education by securing and defending a boy’s right to desire like a woman/mother.

A traditional public school education entails learning skills, especially (though it is never explicitly acknowledged) the skill (and appreciation) of straight maleness (i.e., normative masculinity). Between the ages of 5 and 6, boys are forced by law to leave the sphere of maternal power (i.e., the home/family) and enter the public school system. It is in the public school classroom that they begin to learn, formally (i.e., curriculum) and informally (i.e., socially), to desire “proper” manhood or straight maleness.

The irony is that the reproduction of “proper” manhood necessarily requires/inspires homoerotic desire. Boys must be motivated to undertake an education in normative masculinity. Thus, they are taught to want men/manhood.

You may argue that what boys are taught is the protocols of normative masculinity rather than to desire adult males–but the foundation of straight logic is that sex, gender, and sexuality are inextricably linked. Male/penis > masculine > heterosexual. In other words, a boy can’t want masculinity without also wanting men.

A second irony: the propagation of masculinity requires a boy to desire like a woman/mother. The transmission of normative masculinity from one generation to the next requires, at least initially, the misalignment of sex, gender, and desire (i.e., male/penis desiring man/masculine). It is at this early stage that normative masculinist logic shows its ass (= its vulnerability).

The vulnerability of normative masculinity is its unnaturalness. In other words, “proper” maleness does not inevitably proceed from being born with a penis. “Proper” maleness must be taught.

The fact that straight maleness is taught is not exactly the problem. The way normative masculinity is taught is the source of its tyranny. “Normal” masculinity is presented uncritically, and it requires uncritical acceptance to be mistaken for normal (i.e., natural) or, as the Trump Administration prefers, for “biological truth.”

Traditionally, this is why the acknowledgment of (male) homosexuality in public schools has been a source of straight panic. It exposes the hole of straight maleness: straight masculinity is not natural. It is optional.

Nowadays, homosexuality is not as often considered inherently opposed to straight masculinity. It’s an interesting development. Today, dudes sucking dick (homie head, brojob, etc.) is just another way for boys to be boys.

Straight ideology is flexible, and gay identity politics is clever. It’s a win-win situation: straight masculinity remains (if not natural) inherently desirable, and male homosexuals are welcome to enjoy its privileges–well, at least if they are good students, willing to learn/embody the protocols of “proper” masculinity.

So, recent arguments before the Supreme Court about readings in public schools that mention same-sex desire may be read as a form of social progress. Before books that acknowledge the reality of happy adult male homosexual relationships (happiness being what I think Justice Alito means by the “subtle” moral message of the book that offends religious conservatives) defiled God’s male children, the biggest threat to the “proper” education of our male children was the gay male English teacher. And before the English teacher became sus, the “gay” male philosopher was considered the corrupter of male youth.

“In a famous passage in The Divine Comedy,” writes David M. Halperin in “Deviant Teaching” (2007, 146-167), Dante represents himself as encountering, in the course of his journey through Hell, the soul of [philosopher] Brunetto Latini . . .” (146). Why did Dante put poor Brunetto in Hell? “His sin is tellingly not named in Canto 15, but other passages in Inferno remove any doubts about its identity. Brunetto is damned for sodomy” (146).

When Dante asks him about his companions in Hell, Brunetto answers that “all were clerks and great men of letters, in the world defined by one [and the] same sin” (148). “Sodomy,” Halperin declares, “is evidently a sin to which literary scholars, critics, and writers (such as Dante himself) are particularly prone” (148).

Halperin, a public university English professor trained as a classicist–and no stranger to controversy–reminds us of “how ancient is the association between teaching and sodomy, between paedagogy and paederasty” (149). “[T]he abolition of any clear or firm distinction between the relation of teacher and student and the relation of lover and beloved is,” Halperin writes, “one of the most notorious consequences of Plato’s metaphysical theory of erotic desire” (149). Teaching “has an extended history of association with deviance and has long figured as a deviant practice” (151).

If gender were a “biological truth,” as the Trump Administration claims it is, then straight anxiety inspired by the fantasy of homosexual indoctrination in public schools would be a genuine absurdity. The reality of old school straight anxiety exposes a glitch in the code of masculinist transmission: gender is a social–not a biological–reality. It must be taught and learned.

For a boy to become a man, he must leave the maternal sphere, the home. He must also leave his father’s side. A boy’s father “is too closely tied to the boy by blood and domesticity . . . so they cannot fully . . . incarnate the cultural ideal of male identity . . . ” (151).

Every proper boy,” Halperin writes, “has to have at least two daddies” (151, emphasis original). Boys learn to become traditional or “proper” men in the public sphere (e.g., schools, sports teams, etc.).

The glitch in the heteronormative educational regime is further exposed by how it represents the social transmission of masculinity (154-155). Consider how the Sambia of Papua New Guinea ritualize the reproduction of strong warrior men.

Elder males take boys ages 8-9 off into the forest where they are forced to perform oral sex on adolescent males. Halperin observes that the young boys are taught to think of “cock-sucking as a kind of breast-feeding” (155).

Ingesting semen, the boys receive the nourishment they require to grow “into real men who will be strong warriors” (155). They continue to ingest semen until they turn 15, at which point they become “the breast” for younger boys.

Listening to social and religious conservatives today, one would never know that third and fourth grade boys in the U.S. are not being taught to suck cock in public schools. What they are being taught, and in ways not entirely different from how the Sambia “represent to themselves symbolically the means by which they reproduce themselves socially,” is how to become proper Western men (156, emphasis original).

Halperin considers the 1953 Western movie Shane an example of a Western form of masculine transmission. The movie’s focus on the mechanics of masculine reproduction makes it a standout Western (157).

Shane is about how a 9-year-old boy, Joey, is made into a man (i.e., taught how to shoot a gun and fight) by a mysterious stranger, “a gunfighter and a killer” (i.e., a social deviant), a cowboy named Shane (158). Joey’s father cannot teach Joey how to become a man because he is too busy managing and defending the family farm. For obvious reasons, Joey’s mother can’t possibly teach him how to become a man.

Halperin compares Shane to the Holy Ghost. “It is only when Shane’s potent shadow falls across the holy American family that the family succeeds in . . . reproducing masculinity . . . and ensuring its own futurity” (159–for my reading of the Holy Ghost, go here). And “[g]unfighting in Shane is,” Halperin observes, “like cock-sucking among the Sambia: both are cultural practices connected with initiation into the symbolic order of masculinity and heavily laden with phallic meaning” (160).

The relationship between Shane and Joey mirrors the relationship between Shane and Joey’s mother, Marian. It is not sexual, but it is erotic. Marian wants to play with Shane’s pistol, too.

Like his mother, Joey feels some kind of way about Shane. In desiring him, Joey gives Shane the “charismatic power necessary to enable those enamored of him (Joey and male viewers) to accede to manhood by means of identification, emulation, and endless, unfulfilled desire for him” (160).

Moreover, Joey’s desire for Shane is no accident. Like Socrates, Shane has a way with his young male students (160-161). Shane makes his manhood hot to both Marian and Joey (= it’s object a). He inspires Joey (and male viewers) to observe his gun obsessively. Masculinity is transmitted “ocularly” in Shane (162).

In seeing/receiving Shane’s manhood, the male viewers “make the supposedly identity-affirming, gender-consolidating experience of masculine identification coincide, as if nothing could be more normal, with the urgent and inescapable solicitation of homoerotic desire” (162).

Question: Did Shane indoctrinate Joey? Did Shane require Joey to accept his warrior manhood uncritically to begin becoming a “real” man? No. Joey wanted the manhood Shane offered him.

Masculine indoctrination requires boys to accept Shane’s manhood as “biological truth.” In that way, Shane becomes the “proper” man, the kind of man boys must become to be considered real men, the type of man women must desire and whose prerogatives they must support to be identified as pious/conservative/real women.

Shane’s “Republican manhood,” if you will, undoubtedly continues to appeal to women/mothers and their boys. I accept that, and I am prepared to secure and defend a boy’s right to want Shane and to become a man who either desires women/mothers or other men who desire men like Shane.

There is nothing inherently wrong with conservative masculinity. That is, I think, a liberal (if not progressive) position to hold–and it is consistent with McBride’s–and my own–definition of maternal politics. “[A] mom has love every single one of her children.”

Apparently, dads have a choice in the matter.

What I reject is the fascist spirit that often animates a traditional education in straight maleness. Republican manhood is manifestly not appealing to every boy. It is not even appealing to every boy’s parents, and there is no reason to believe it will appeal to all who will enter a boy’s life as an adult male.

Moreover, it is an offense to common sense and reason (and I, as a biblical Christian theologian, think it is an offense to the gospel of Jesus Christ) to enforce, as a matter of (unacknowledged) policy or law, Republican manhood. If “biological truth” requires the enforcement of norms and/or the sword of law, just how biological–or true–is it?

The assertion of the biological truth of gender reveals that social and religious conservatives have, like a God, forgotten themselves:

For with the old Gods things came to an end long ago–and verily they had a good and joyful Gods’ end! Theirs was no mere “twilight” death–that is a lie!

Rather: one day they–laughed themselves to death!

This happened when the most godless words issued from a God himself–the words: “There is one God! Thou shalt have no other God before me!” . . . a God, most jealous, forgot himself thus:

And thereupon all the Gods laughed and rocked their chairs and shouted: “Is just this not Godliness, that there are Gods but no God?”

He that hath ears let him hear (Thus Spoke Zarathustra [(1883) 2003], 201, italics original).

In a gloss on this passage, psychoanalyst Adam Phillips writes, “God, in Nietzsche’s fabulation, forgot Himself, and even His own name; He thought he was God, THE God, when He was simply one among many others (inner superiority means we are on the wrong track, it means we are too intimidated) (Unforbidden Pleasures [2015], 42).

In another text–but in a similar context–Halperin describes how the “inner superiority” of straight maleness may work out in the context of sexuality and gender, nowadays:

If homophobia sometimes functions less to oppress homosexuals than to police the behavior of heterosexuals and to strong-arm them into keeping one another strictly in line with the requirements of proper sex and gender norms, for fear of appearing queer [remember: declaring “no homo” after receiving, e.g., homie head will protect you from appearing (too) queer] it may be that one of the functions of transphobia is to police the behavior of lesbians and gay men and to terrorize them into conforming to the gender style deemed appropriate to their respective sexes (How To Be Gay [2012], 307, italics mine).

As we discovered earlier, the propagation of straight maleness can accommodate a disconnect between sex and sexuality. Nowadays, being a homosexual doesn’t necessarily make you a sus male (i.e., gaaaaaay).

The chronic misalignment of sex/penis (male) and normative gender style (straight maleness) does, however, remain socially problematic. At some point, one must put childish ways behind them.

At this point, straightness has shown a lot of ass. It concedes that heterosexuality is not natural. No one (bi, lesbian, gay, straight, none) knows what determines one’s sexuality (or lack thereof). It also concedes that straight maleness (i.e., normative masculinity) is not natural: it does not proceed naturally from having a penis. It must be taught (and even enforced).

And given that gender does not proceed naturally from sex or depend on one’s sexuality, it follows that anyone, of whatever sex or sexuality, can, if they so desire, learn a specific gender style. Women can, at least in principle, learn to embody normative masculinity.

What all this means is that the claim of straightness to have no other Gods before it is laughable. But the Gods before it need not laugh themselves to death! Instead, they can get on with baptizing newly persuaded converts.

The epigraph of How To Be Gay, a description of gay male masculinity, or masculinity that is gendered feminine because it is resistant to straight maleness, reads: “Let the pagans beget and the Christians baptize” (see also How To Be Gay, 532-533).

The epigraph of How To Be Gay echoes the central argument of Halperin’s essay, “Deviant Teaching”: The “introduction . . . to [non-sexual methods of instruction in maleness,] to non-standard ways of seeing, to distinctive ethical and aesthetic modes of relating to the surrounding culture, to a unique set of sensibilities, and to dissident ways of reading cultural objects (movies, opera, Broadway musicals, emblems of fashion and styles, embodiments of masculinity) [is] what I have been calling deviant teaching,” and what, in How To be Gay, is called gay male subculture (“Deviant Teaching,” 165).

Gay male subculture, as a deviant form of masculine propagation (i.e., it resists the allure of straight maleness), is similar to straight maleness in that it does not depend on either one’s sex or sexuality. It is a style that anyone who finds persuasive may learn to embody.

Gay maleness is among the gods a boy may reasonably desire. Accordingly, maternal politics entails defending and securing a boy’s right to become a man who desires women/mothers or other men who desire gayness.

As a non-normative gender style, a lifestyle misaligned with one’s sex, gayness is a form of Trans*ness (I use the * to indicate gender nonconformity in addition to sex nonconformity). However, Trans*ness moves us well beyond gender misalignment to sexual misalignment.

In her interview on Pod Save America, McBride addresses one of the challenges of Trans* politics (42 minutes in):  

I think one of the challenges that we have in conversations around Trans identities that’s different than conversations around gay rights is that most people who are straight can understand what it feels like to love and to lust –and so they’re able to enter into conversations around sexual orientation with an analogous experience. People who aren’t Trans don’t know what it feels like to be Trans–and for me the closest thing that I can compare it to is a constant feeling of homesickness, just this unwavering ache in the pit of my stomach that would only go away when I could be seen and affirmed and live as myself . . . .

I imagine one reality that Rep. McBride is expressing here is that her body initially provoked a conversation: Is this you? She answered either “No” or “Not exactly.” I am guessing (because I am unfamiliar with the details of her experience) that McBride desired a new alignment of sex and gender–and one made possible by a radically new understanding of sex: sex, like gender, is not a natural fact. Sex is an opportunity for conversation rather than indoctrination.

Although Evangelical men really want women to have penises, male to female Trans* experience constitutes an upheaval of normative thought. It inspires intense—and, unfortunately, intensely irrational—emotions.

The animus directed toward Trans* women is a fruit of the fascist spirit that often underlies the commitment to the reproduction of Republican manhood–and one that more than a few fruits enjoy. We have only to think of Andrew Sullivan.

Sullivan is usually an interesting and nuanced public intellectual, but his screeds against “big trans” are becoming increasingly overdetermined (i.e., inspired by irrational forces). On a recent episode of Real Time with Bill Maher, Sullivan comments:

I love the idea that Democrats should get back into building things, into making things happen, into deregulating, into supercharging the economy. I just think that until the Democrats address some of the core issues, they seem not to want to control immigration. They have extremist views about race. They think that boys should compete with girls in sports, and that children should be… have their sex reassigned. Until they grapple with that. . . .

We have not taught civics in this country. They’re too busy learning that America is white supremacist without learning that there are three branches of government. They’re all separate. They’re kept apart so that we can be freer than other countries. Why are we teaching that? We should be teaching that (italics mine).

The claim that Democrats “think . . . that children should be . . . have their sex reassigned” is blatantly false. I am curious, though, about the Levitical themes of Sullivan’s commentary: separation and purity.

Sullivan seems to think biological males should not be separated from their penises–even when they desire to be so separated. In his view, effeminate gay boys are being misled by “big trans” into thinking they are Trans* women rather than gay males. “Big trans,” again in Sullivan’s view, is “transing away the gay.”

The second of Sullivan’s falsehoods, related, I think, to the first, is: “We have not taught civics in this country.” Sullivan seems to believe that “we” have not learned anything about the separation of powers–and too much about the separation of racial groups enforced by those same powers for several centuries.

Is his argument that “we” would become less preoccupied with white supremacy if “we” were taught the philosophy of “separate but equal”? If I am not mistaken, “we” were taught in school that Sullivan’s approach is not unique in history. Hence the focus on white supremacy.

I don’t think it’s uncharitable to read the argument of the unruly forces underlying Sullivan’s Leviticus-like political theology this way: In a good society, penises should remain attached to their original bodies; races, like the branches of the U.S. government (like the sexes?), should be separate but equal.

Maternal politics, at least as I understand it, entirely rejects Sullivan’s (unconscious) definition of a “good” society. Instead, it defends and secures a biological male’s right to discern who they are, really–including a woman/mother who desires women and/or men who desire a new alignment of sex and gender.

Maternal politics, as I understand it, is a form of deviant politics. Securing and defending the right of boys to become (wo)men who desire like women/mothers takes us into scandalous and fraught territory.

How do we talk about maternal politics across a range of issues that are important to our fellow citizens? In other words, how do we make it an electorally desirable politics? If we allow ourselves to have a real conversation about the political body, what is our answer to the question, Is this us?

If maternal politics appeals to us, it could be defined more broadly as taking public action(s) to secure and defend everyone’s right to have complicated conversations about the political body, especially now. Among the lessons Trump has (unknowingly) taught us is that we require a genuine upheaval of political thought.

What is Biological Truth?

Kiki Smith: Tale, 1992. Beeswax, microcrystaline wax, pigment, and papier-mache.

Quick Thought(s):

I was taken aback by a recent executive order titled, in part, “Restoring Biological Truth.” While others have undoubtedly analyzed the Order’s views on sex, gender, ideology, extremism, and more, what intrigued me—and truly rattled me—was the strange pairing of biology and truth.

The Order performs what is at stake in its assertion of “truth.” First, it is notable that the Order claims (the meaning of) truth precedes critical investigation: “Basing Federal policy on truth is critical to scientific inquiry, public safety, morale, and trust in government itself.”

Moreover, the Order claims that truth is both traditional and “immutable.” Truth is a product of accrued cultural experience and is also somehow synonymous with “immutable. . .reality.” Gender ideology is “an ongoing and purposeful attack against the ordinary and longstanding use and understanding of biological and scientific terms, replacing the immutable biological reality of sex with an internal, fluid, and subjective sense of self unmoored from biological facts.”

Furthermore, the Order asserts that reality is “fundamental and incontrovertible.” Yet, it requires an executive order to enforce and promote it? “These sexes [male and female] are not changeable and are grounded in fundamental and incontrovertible reality. Under my direction, the Executive Branch will enforce all sex-protective laws to promote this reality, . . .”

The Order’s claim that gender ideology is “unmoored from biological facts” is bizarre, given that Trans* people, for example, are biological facts. We also know that some portion of the population is intersex. The order to “restore biological truth” not only ignores Trans* and intersex bodies—it ignores all animal bodies.

Patricia Piccinini, The Young Family, 2002, silicone, fiberglass, leather, human hair, plywood.

A less comfortable observation: What disturbed me about “biological truth” is the idea of human frailty and biological grossness. Who wants “biological truth”?

But this takes us in a different direction from the Order, which denies biological truth and what it means for our human lives precisely by asserting it. The Order tries to end the conversation about what is truly disturbing—and what disturbed me: messy, changing, mortal, material biological reality.

In his study of William James, psychoanalyst Adam Phillips, in On Getting Better, makes helpful observations about both truth and biology. First, truth—Phillips writes: “Here in brief is James’s credo: . . .believe and consider true whatever you need to believe, even God, in order to be the person you want to be. . . (145). On biology, Phillips notes: “As what James calls ‘natural men,’ we are ineluctably in the flux of biological change, a change running alongside and in tandem with our ideals for ourselves that our cultures provide” (155).

As a pragmatic idea, what is true is what gives you the life you desire. Apparently, what is true for Trump is a life sans biological reality. For him, the truth is what does not embody the ineluctable “flux of biological change.” But what about those of us who do not desire an exclusively ideal life? Or, what about those of us who know that so much of human tragedy results from attempts to live an ideal life?

Trump’s Order gives renewed meaning to David M. Halperin’s argument, made in Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography: Whenever we (i.e., bodies that incarnate queer truths [i.e., biological truths]) hear the Trump Administration “invoke the notion of ‘truth,’ we reach for our revolvers” (185).

The Irony of Loving Monogamy

Wedding dress designed by John Galliano, worn by Gwen Stefani, 2002

“Certainly, to talk about monogamy is to talk about virtually everything that might matter. . . . Monogamy is a kind of moral nexus, a keyhole through we can spy on our preoccupations.” – Adam Phillips, Monogamy, ii.

“Nothing defeats us like success. It is always more baffling—more essentially ironic—than failure.” — Adam Phillips, Monogamy, #47.

“Owe no one anything, except to love one another.” — Paul of Tarsus, Romans 13:8

I.

I am no apologist for monogamy.

Yet, most people desire it for themselves. And most people, even those for whom it seems to be working out well, don’t seem to love monogamy. I think that is interesting.

Most people don’t love monogamy, but yet they still believe in it. So, it is worth asking: What promises to make loving monogamy promising?

My answer is irony. Irony is the key to loving monogamy. Or so I will now argue.

Monogamy is a sacred cultural norm, but as Adam Phillips, in a fascinating interview regarding his book, Monogamy (1996), observes, “the flawed relationship, or the relationship that doesn’t work, gets all the press.” We have a lot of interest in relational failure.

What we don’t have, according to Phillips, “is . . . very good language for celebrating good relationships. There’s a sense in which the good monogamous relationship . . . doesn’t have very good language to describe it. I think that is interesting.”

In the aforementioned interview, Phillips searches for good enough language to describe “what makes relationships between people work.”

I think what makes relationships work between people is extremely mysterious. I mean, we used to call it chemistry. And if it weren’t so silly, I’d want to go back to using words like that. Something really quite mysterious and unpredictable happens between people.

The “mysterious and unpredictable” quality of relationships between people is likely what inspires us to lean on the language of faith to describe relationships that work, as the “mysterious and unpredictable” quality of those relationships likely calls forth our, to use Julia Kristeva’s idea for my own purposes, “incredible need to believe.”

“Believing in monogamy,” Phillips writes, “is not unlike believing in God” (Monogamy, #1).

II.

Mechthild of Magdeburg offers us one interesting example of what it is like to believe in God. In Flowing Light of the Godhead (written between 1250-1280 CE), Mechthild seeks sex with God. Advised instead “to refresh [herself] in love” by bowing “down to the small Child in the lap of the eternal virgin,” she refuses (see Book I, §44).

Mechthild refuses to accept the blessed child as a proxy for her Lover/God. “That is child’s love, that one suckle and rock a baby,” she asserts. “I am a full-grown bride. I want to go to my Lover” (§44).

She is warned about how dangerous is such a direct approach to God: “Oh, Lady, if you go there / We shall go completely blind / The Godhead is so blazing hot” (§44). So warned, she goes directly to God.

Upon meeting her Lover, Mechthild is encouraged to take off all of her clothes. What follows is a kind of anticipatory silence between them. She discreetly alludes to what happens next: “What happens to her then—she knows— / And that is fine with me” (§44).

Mechthild and God enjoy a quickie. “[T]his cannot last long,” she observes. And they depart from one another “inseparably” (§44).  

The brief sexual meeting of Mechthild and God is described as taking place in secret: “When two lovers meet secretly / They must often part from one another inseparably” (§44). In seeking sexual intimacy with God through contemplation (the 13th-century virtual world?), the Beguine mystic secretly escapes her existing relationship to the world, including to the Church.

Mechthild’s theology is interesting because she explicitly includes sexual pleasure as a feature of what it is like to believe in God. “And about pleasure we are all mystics.” Or so Phillips argues. “We are all terrified of suffering too much of it. For some people the best solution to this is infidelity, for others monogamy. To each his own asceticism” (#71).

Mechthild’s asceticism is, I think, a form of infidelity. Infidelity, however, is not always what we think it is. In escaping her existing relationship to the world of people, she reveals the one with whom she is actually doing monogamy. She desires God. Infidelity is always intertwined with monogamy.

Infidelity, moreover, is not always as dangerous as we think it is. “People have relationships,” Phillips contends, “not because they want to feel safe—though they often think they do—but because they want to find out what the danger is. This is where infidelity can let people down” (#34).

Mechthild, warned about the danger of rawdogging God, ends up proving herself right: there is, in fact, no danger in having sex with God. Prior to hooking up with God, she argues: “A fish in water does not drown. / A bird in the air does not plummet. / Gold in fire does not perish. . . . / How, then, am I to resist my nature? / I must go from all things to God / Who is my Father by nature” (§44). Sex with God is, for Mechthild, the safest sex imaginable because it is sex with her very nature.

Her “nature” begins to take on meaning when she refuses the blessed Child. Her desire to go directly to God is about far more than an unwillingness to allow Jesus to fuck up her relationship with God. “Child’s love,” notice, is defined in parental, specifically maternal, terms. It is “child’s love, that one suckle and rock a baby.” In refusing the blessed Child, Mechthild is refusing to identify with the maternal figure of her love story. So “utterly formed to [God’s] nature, / not the slightest thing,” however, “can come between [her] and [God, her Father by nature]” (§44). Mechthild radically identifies with God the Father.

The meaning of her “nature” is also signified by the easy interchability of the main roles in her love story, Lover and beloved. Mechthild clearly defines God as the Lover of her story. Yet, she is the one who is obsessed with God. She is the one who knocks down the door to God’s bedchamber. She is the one who insists on sex with God. In this story, Mechthild is the Lover, or God (i.e., the subject of erôs)—and God is the beloved, or Mechthild (i.e., the love-object).

Sex with God is the safest sex one can think of because God is, at least in Book I, §44 of Flowing Light, Mechthild (and vice versa). Sex with God is the safest sex, the safest incest one can think of because it is not unlike masturbaton. “My sexual relationship with myself,” Phillips observes, “is a study in monogamy” (#60).

“The virtue of monogamy,” Phillips contends, “is the ease with which it can turn sex into masturbation [which Phillips also describes as “safe incest”]; the vice of monogamy is that it gives you nothing else. . . . The only truly monogamous relationship is the one we have with ourselves” (#101).

Believing in God is not unlike the incredible need to believe in ourselves.

Nonetheless, most people are not as faithful to God as is Mechthild. “Why,” wonders Phillips, “do we, at least apparently, [continue to] have sex with other people, why include them at all?” (#101). What is the danger?

III.

David M. Halperin identifies a surprising feature of sex that may account for why we want to include, apparently, other people in our sex lives. The danger of sex with an-other person is the promise of love.

In “What Is Sex For?” (2016), Halperin tries to make sense of why Adele’s hit song, “Someone Like You” (2011) is “blaring” from a gay bathhouse in Hanoi. To that end, he turns to Aristotle, specifically to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, chapter 22 of part 2.

According to Halperin, Aristotle argues “that it is in the nature of erotic desire itself to seek—in and through sex, customarily—the experience of being loved. Love is the telos of erotic desire. It is not love that aims at sex as its goal or that seeks to express itself through the act of sex. It is sex that aims at love” (19, emphasis original).

To the subject of erôs, to the one inhabited by erotic desire (rather than by lust or by appetite), sex is, customarily, a means to love. I initially read Halperin’s summary of Aristotle to mean that sex mediates between erotic desire (or passion) and love: erotic desire, through sex, seeks love.

My initial reading of Halperin’s summary of Aristotle was a promising mis-reading, as it provoked thought about the space between erotic desire and love. However, as the last sentence of the summary above indicates, erotic desire is taking the form of sex in Aristotle’s argument. Erotic desire = sex.

Halperin goes on to significantly complicate Aristotle’s already subtle sexual logic. For example, he wonders if sex does, in fact, naturally seek love? Does erotic desire naturally seek what is beyond itself? Halperin does not directly answer that question in “What Is Sex For?,” but he does answer it in an earlier work, How To Be Gay (2012).

Sex, however, is not the subject of How To Be Gay. Erotic desire customarily, but not always, takes the form of sex. It can take other, cultural, forms. Erotic desire can take the form of an obsession with interior design or with feminine figures, like Joan Crawford. Halperin explores the cultural vicissitudes of erotic desire in How To Be Gay.

The lesson of How To Be Gay is that erotic desire does not, not naturally, seek love. Mechthild’s example teaches us the same lesson, but in a different erotic sphere: sex does not naturally seek love-objects: objects beyond the confines of its exacting criteria.

Erotic desire does not, not naturally, seek what is beyond itself. Its love-objects are always underwhelming. So, if what we want is to somehow love the objects of our desire, then we must learn to do something with our erotic desire.

If what we want is a loving monogamy, then we must learn to ironize sex.

IV.

In How To Be Gay, traditional gay male culture teaches its disciples how to re-direct erotic desire through irony, specifically through camp irony, to its love-objects. Describing camp irony may give us an example of how to ironize sex, of how to think of sex in terms of irony.

To that end, we may consult a promising section of How To Be Gay. Notice how camp and intimacy are intimately intertwined in the lengthy citation below. Moreover, camp and intimacy are linked in the context of explaining the lasting character of a monogamous relationship:  

Many years ago I asked a friend of mine in Boston, who had been living with the same boyfriend for a very long time, if it had ever occurred to them to want to get married. “Oh, no,” he said with a laugh, “we’d have terrible fights over who got to wear the wedding dress.” That witticism, if it had been directed against someone other than oneself, or against someone other than the person one loved, would have registered as merely demeaning in its implicit demotion of a man from the noble rank of male dignity to the lower rank of female triviality. And it would be doubly demeaning in the context of gay male love: since male homosexuality sees in masculinity an essential erotic value, to portray oneself or one’s partner as characterized by feminine identification to public mockery, would be to depreciate oneself or one’s boyfriend as a sexual object and vehicle of sexual fantasy.

. . . .

Leo Bersani conveys powerfully the sense of gay chagrin at the ineluctable failure of gay masculinity by citing “the classic put-down: the butch number swaggering into a bar in a leather get-up opens his mouth and sounds like a pansy, takes you home where the first thing you notice is the complete works of Jane Austin, gets you into bed and—well, you know the rest.”

Or in the unlikely event that, even after getting you into bed, he still managed to keep up butch appearances, all your remaining illusions would be shattered—according to the lead character of Armistead Maupin’s Tale of The City (1978)—when you eventually excused yourself to use his bathroom and discovered his supply of personal cosmetics.

. . . .

It is in this context that my friend’s remark about his boyfriend and himself coveting the wedding dress reveals its true significance. To utter it is to know oneself and one’s love-object as unworthy of the serious consideration that is masculine dignity’s due. It is to disclaim the presence to masculine authenticity, and the erotic credit that accrues to it, and to refuse in camp fashion to dignify oneself at the expense of someone else’s shame. At the same time, it insists that such inauthenticity is not incompatible with gay love. . . . On the contrary, it demonstrates that inauthenticity is not fatal to love, that seriousness does not have to prevail over irony in order for love to thrive and to endure.

To see through one’s own erotic illusions without withdrawing from one’s love-object its worthiness to be loved, to disclaim one’s entitlement to respect while continuing to assert it, to love and be loved without endowing one’s love with dignity; this is the possibility that traditional gay male culture holds out to its adherents. The supreme wisdom consists in living one’s life knowingly as melodrama—understanding full well (if not necessarily explicitly) that melodrama signifies both a degraded genre of literary discourse and a debased pragmatic genre of emotional expression: a despised, feminized, laughable, trivial style of expressing one’s feelings.

No wonder my friends from Boston could build a lasting relationship together while the gay baths and back rooms and sex clubs and online cruising sites thrive on the business of gay romantics, who prefer their own illusions, their fantasies of love, to actual people—people who, after all, cannot sustain those illusions, not at least for very long. That last remark is hardly intended as a put-down of those who frequent the baths . . . ; it’s just a reminder of what those unique gay male institutions are for. Which is not to help us live happily ever after, but to enable us to crowd as many anti-social thrills as possible into the moment and to provide us with a structured communal space in which to . . . discharge our romantic fantasies—without doing ourselves or our partners any lasting harm.

To live one’s life as melodrama, to do so knowingly and deliberately, is not of course to refuse to take it seriously—as any gay Joan Crawford fan . . . can tell you. But it is to accept the inauthenticity at the core of romantic love, to understand romantic love as a social institution, an ideology, a role, a performance, a social genre, while still, self-consciously and undeceivedly, succumbing to it.

In short, it is to do what is otherwise culturally impossible—impossible for normal folks, that is to combine passion with irony (291-294).

Participation in gay male culture enables the boyfriends from Boston to do what would otherwise be impossible, “impossible for normal folks, that is to combine passion with irony.” By putting on, if you will, a wedding dress, the boyfriends from Boston reveal their identification with a particular form of irony, with a particular fashion style, namely camp.

“Camp fashion,” as Halperin defines it above, is a refusal “to dignify oneself at the expense of someone else’s shame.” The specific object of its refusal is seriousness. Camp refuses to take masculinity seriously, as something other than a role, an ideology, a melodramatic performance. And at the same time, camp does not dismiss the erotic value of masculinity simply because it is a performance. To the contrary, camp enables one to “self-consciously and undeceivedly” enjoy it—and even to “[succumb] to it.”

It is camp fashion, camp irony, that enables the boyfriends from Boston to live their lives “knowingly as melodrama,” to embody both passion and irony at once—and it promises to make their relationship promising or lasting.

The couple’s participation in camp culture is contrasted in the citation above with gay male participation in sexual institutions like “gay baths and back rooms and sex clubs and online cruising sites.” All those gay male romantics wandering the halls of the baths, clothed only in simple white towels, indicate that there is nothing essentially ironic about (gay male) sex.

That is why Adele’s hit song, “Someone Like You,” blaring from a bathhouse in Hanoi, is so interesting. Like the wedding dress, the song alerts us to the (probable) presence of gay male culture. “[I]t is probable,” Halperin writes in “What Is Sex For?,” “that at least some bathhouse patrons, especially those of us who go often, have a further purpose in returning to those venues again and again . . . . Could we be in search of something that sex promises but does not, by itself, offer us . . . ,” namely “someone like you”?

Sex “promises” something that it cannot, “by itself,” deliver—and the (probable) presence of gay male culture reveals what sex requires to get to love: irony. Subjects of erôs must learn to “see through” their erotic illusions. Seeing through their erotic illusions, they are enabled to enjoy the “butch number” or the hot sex while also refusing to withdraw from the other person, on account of the sound of their voice, their obsession with Jane Austen, or their personal cosmetics (on account of their failure to perfectly live up to the exacting demands of erotic desire), their worthiness to be loved.

V.

We now recognize camp as an erotic style, a way of combining what is serious and unserious, sacred and profane, passionate and ironic. But we are trying to describe the erotic style appropriate to sex. Describing how camp camps—how, that is, camp manages to combine traditionally opposed, unequal social values—will help us more precisely define the erotic style appropriate to our sex lives.

What camp does is teach us how to demean erotic desire. “Gay may culture,” Halperin writes in How To Be Gay, “has . . . elaborated a distinctive, dissident perspective on romantic love [i.e., erotic desire], which straight people often regard as cynical. . . ” (294). Straight people regard it as cynical because “its irony . . . seems to them to undermine the seriousness and sincerity of love, and thereby demean it” (294, emphasis mine).

“Camp doesn’t preach;” Halperin observes, “it demeans” (191). It demeans the serious, the sacred, the masculine. In other words, camp sets erotic desire free; it breaks “the romantic monopoly on it,” making it “more widely available” for “social uses,” ending “the antagonism between love [i.e., erotic desire] and society, between love [i.e., erotic desire] and friendship, between the happy couple and the community.” It is this “camp sensibility” that, “at their wisest, gay male love [i.e., erotic] relationships exemplify and embody” (295).

Camp demeans erotic desire in a cultural context. In our sexual relationships, fucking is a word that registers something other than respectul, self-edifying coitus. In the sexual sphere, it seems promising to ironize erotic desire by fucking it.

By fucking erotic desire, the subjects of erôs, at least those who participate in gay male culture, are enabled to “see through” their erotic illusions, to see through what is taken as deadly serious, and to recognize it as a role that can be “undeceivedly” enjoyed. The aim is to end antagonisms (e.g., between the sacred and the profane, self and other), to make love (or friendship) with an-other a promising possibility.

VI.

The reason why fucking or demeaning erotic desire matters is latent in the idea of what it promises to make promising: the end of antagonisms, love of/friendship with an-other one. Fucking erotic desire (e.g., masculinity, the Sacred, monogamy, etc.) is a means of democratizing it (or, as Halperin also argues, desublimating it [294]). Fucking erotic desire is the erotic fashion of embodying what are traditionally opposed, unequal social values (e.g., fidelity and infidelity).

Again, a simple social practice, one we may playfully describe as drinking erotic desire, may help us to more clearly define what is at stake in fucking it: democracy or love.

In “Small Town Boy: Neil Bartlett Learns How to Be Gay” (2007), Halperin highlights power inequalities between differently aged gay men. The social practice proposed as a means of negotiating power disparities between said men is, now citing Bartlett, “that man buying his younger boyfriend (slightly embarrassed, but happily drunk) another drink.”

Bartlett cannot think the seemingly simple, everyday practice of an older man buying his younger boyfriend a drink without remembering “that man,” Oscar Wilde: “I remember the bizarre twisting of mythologies [i.e., romantic illusions] Wilde used to justify his adoration of young men,” Bartlett writes, “the mixing of a pastiche of Classical pederasty with a missionary zeal for the ‘criminal classes,’ the sense that they, not the boys he left sleeping in [his home in] Chelsea, were his true sons . . . .”  Remembering this history, “[o]ur history,” according to Bartlett, “becomes a way of understanding and exploring the change in our [present day] culture [i.e., of writing a history of the present], not simply of reading it as an ‘end.’”

From Bartlett’s perspective, an older man buying his younger boyfriend a drink “is not,” Halperin observes, “necessarily a mere recapitulation of archaic and unchanging forms of social hierarchy, upper-class sexual privilege and working-class sexual prostitution.” It is, at least potentially, now again citing Bartlett, “a new kind of relationship, an affair of the heart somehow appropriate to the meeting of two different men . . . .”

“Differences in age and wealth,” Halperin writes, “may actually be serving new, dynamic social functions, creating possibilities . . . among men who are asymmetrically situated according to conventional class hierarchies but are brought into approximate equality by the reciprocal exchanges of contemporary gay male life.”

Sex—well, at least understood from within the logic of Adele’s “Someone Like You”—may not be unlike that drink between an older man and his younger boyfriend (perhaps they are sitting at bar while Whitney Houston’s hit song, “How Will I Know?,” plays in the background?). That drink “may actually be serving new, dynamic social functions, creating possibilities . . . among men who” occupy differently valued social categories and by bringing them “into approximate equality.” Sex, like that drink, may become, to use Bartlett’s terms, “an affair of the heart somehow appropriate to the meeting of two different men.”

VII.

Monogamy/marriage can’t, as Phillips argues, be an affair—but it is possible that fucking sex may re-make it into a matter “of the heart somehow appropriate to the meeting of two different men,” two different women, two different people (#83).

Loving monogamy is not unlike dis-believing in God.

Un-faithfulness to God is not what we learn from Mechthild’s example. In Flowing Light, at least Book I, §44, we walk in on Mechthild masturbating; we witness Mechthild’s incredible need to believe in herself. She is both the subject and object of erotic desire.

Mechthild, however, is different from other subjects of erôs, such as the “romantics” we encountered in the lengthy citation from How To Be Gay. Romantics are constantly disappointed when their love-objects, recognized as distinct objects in the world, fail to conform to their erotic illusions. Mechthild is her own love-object.

Mechthild does not admit any space between her and her love-object. There is no room to hope for irony in Mechthild’s erotic life. She is “so utterly formed to [God’s] nature” that “not the slightest thing can be between [her] and [God, her Father by nature].”

Mechthild and gay male romantics do share one thing in common. They look up to the heavens. This is where fidelity can sometimes let people down.

Mechchild’s love story may prove promising, however, for the idea that God, the word par excellence for the deadly serious, the seriously masculine, the Sacred, wholeness/health, etc, is dtf.

The promise of a fuckable God, of a fuckable monogamy, a monogamy we learn to take im-personally or un-seriously, is what God’s fuckablity makes promising: a lasting, loving relationship with an-other, or a loving monogamy. Fucking God, we, at least potentially, empower an-other one, a different one, to excite us.

Significantly, fucking God does not come naturally to us. It is something we must learn to do. The irony is that being a participant in gay male culture is not unlike being a member of the Church. Halperin hints at this in How To Be Gay. The epigraph of the book, Albert Mollegen’s summary of Augustine’s theology, reads: “Let the Christians baptize and the pagans beget.”

Gay male culture, not unlike Christianity, entails enculturation. It is not a birthright. Gay male culture, not unlike monogamy, is unnatural. As such, anyone who finds it persuasive may participate in it. Which makes sense, as gay male culture, not unlike Christianity, not unlike monogamy, is an education in how to love who and what you erotically desire.

One, final irony: if a loving monogamy is what is desired, “it may be heterosexuals, nowadays . . . who need gay male culture more than gay men do themselves” (How To Be Gay, 456).